Recent research documents that institutional or large investors act as antagonists to other investors by showing opposite trading behavior following disclosure of new information. Using an extremely comprehensive official transactions data set from Finland, we set out to explore the interrelation between investor size and behavior. More specifically, we test whether investor size is positively (negatively) correlated with investor reaction following positive (negative) news. We document robust evidence of that investor size affects investor behavior under new information, as larger investors on average react more positively (negatively) to good (bad) news than smaller investors. We furthermore find that the performance of smaller, or more overconfident, investors is in general hurt by their behavior. In the light of this study it seems increasingly feasible that several recent findings of heterogeneous investor behavior are functions of differences in overconfidence.
Introduction
Recent research by Lee (1992) , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) , Cohen et al. (2002) and Ekholm (2006) documents that large investors act as antagonists to other investors by showing opposite trading behavior following the disclosure of new information. The underlying dynamics of this systematic behavior however remain largely unexplored. Further, it seems increasingly feasible that investment decisions may be affected by psychological biases, such as overconfidence 1 . Ekholm (2006) suggests that differences in trading behavior when new information is disclosed are driven by differences in overconfidence, and that investor size is a good measure of overconfidence. The contribution of this study is to thoroughly explore the interrelation between investor overconfidence, size and behavior.
We document robust evidence of that investor size describes investor behavior under new information, as larger investors systematically react more positively (negatively) to good (bad) news than smaller investors. We also find that the performance of smaller, or more overconfident, investors is in general hurt by their behavior. It seems unlikely that our findings are an artifact of comparing extremely large investors with extremely small investors, as the behavior is found to be a fairly linear function of investor size. Our results lend firm support to that investor size is a good proxy for investor overconfidence, and that differences in overconfidence result in the observed behavior.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses and discusses the implemented methodology. Section 3 describes the data. Results are displayed and analyzed in Section 4. Finally, section 5 summarizes the paper.
Hypotheses and methodology
In this section we first discuss how differences in overconfidence for different groups of investors will systematically affect trading between these groups. Further, we present the methodology employed in this paper.
1 See De Long et al. (1990 , 1991 , Kyle and Wang (1997) , Benos (1998) , Daniel et al. (1998) , Odean (1998) , Hong and Stein (1999) , Gervais and Odean (2001) , and Wang (2001) for theoretical models of overconfident investors in financial markets. Empirical evidence of investor overconfidence is presented by for instance Odean (2000, 2001 ).
Hypotheses
As discussed by Odean (1998) , overconfidence has been documented for individuals in numerous professions, e.g. nurses, engineers, attorneys and market professionals. Moreover, Odean (2000, 2001 ) document empirical evidence of some investors being overconfident, and Kyle and Wang (1997) , Benos (1998) and Wang (2001) theoretically propose that overconfident investors can survive in a stock market. Ekholm (2006) finds evidence indicating that investor size can be used as a proxy for the level of overconfidence. Further, Gervais and Odean (2001) theoretically show that the level of overconfidence decreases as an investor becomes more experienced. In the Gervais and Odean (2001) framework investors gain experience by participating in the stock market, and thus the level of experience depends both on the amount of time spent in the stock market and the intensity of participation. We argue that investor size is a good proxy for investor experience, hence implying a negative relation between size and overconfidence. Our argument builds on that larger investment portfolios tend to on average be managed by investors who are more experienced than smaller investors. This is true, since the wealth of individual investors tends to increase with tenure and experience. Furthermore, the wealthiest individuals and institutional investors 2 consult investment professionals, who by default have above-average experience due to their extensive participation in the stock market. As overconfidence decreases with experience, it will thus also decrease with investor size. Ekholm (2006) models the trading behavior of groups exhibiting different levels of overconfidence when new information arrives to the marketplace. We use the framework of Ekholm (2006) , presented next, in order to understand how behavior under new information could vary for groups showing different levels of overconfidence.
Let us assume that the stock market is populated by (at least) two types of investors, S and U, of which S are less overconfident than U. Both S and U can access public information PUB t-1 and private information PRI t-1 at time t-1. 3 The value they view as correct for a company is determined as an unknown function f(•) of both types of information:
2 E.g. mutual funds, which also manage small investors' pooled assets.
3 Private information is here defined as both information additional to the public information (e.g. rumors, information gathered through personal contacts) and personal interpretation (analysis) of public information.
In equilibrium, the value perceived as correct by the two types of investors of a company at time t-1, when no new information is available on the market, equals the market value.
At time t new public information PUB t and (orthogonal) private information PRI t arrives on the market, which would to the fully rational investor indicate a shift
where w PUB + w PRI = 1, ∆V PUB, t ⊥ ∆V PRI, t and E(∆V PRI, t ) = 0 (4) in the value of the company. However, since the two types of investors S and U are overconfident, they will give the new public information less weight than the fully rational investor, as they exaggerate the importance of their private information. The perceived new values are thus:
where w S, PUB + w S, PRI = 1, ∆V PUB, t ⊥ ∆V PRI, t and E(∆V PRI, t ) = 0 (5a) and
where w U, PUB + w U, PRI = 1, ∆V PUB, t ⊥ ∆V PRI, t and E (∆V PRI, t ) = 0 (5b)
Since investors of type S are less overconfident than investors of type U, investors of type S give more weight to new public information and less weight to new private information than investors of type U, thus w S, PUB > w U, PUB and consequently w S, PRI < w U, PRI . Accordingly, as ∆V PUB, t ⊥ ∆V PRI, t and E(∆V PRI, t ) = 0, we get:
Therefore, when public information interpreted as positive (negative) by the fully rational investor is received by the market, the value perceived as correct by the less overconfident investors S will on average be higher (lower) than the value perceived as correct by the more overconfident investors U. If the new public information is interpreted as neutral by the fully rational investor, all investor types will on average agree on the value of the company.
The implications for transaction behaviour under new earnings information are apparent:
when the market receives positive (negative) public information regarding a company, less overconfident investors will on average buy (sell) company stock from (to) more overconfident investors, until a new valuation equilibrium is reached.
As a direct consequence of that investor size proxies investor overconfidence and of the framework presented above, we arrive at the following two hypotheses:
H1:
On the arrival of news that is interpreted as positive by the market, larger investors on average react more positively than smaller investors.
H2:
On the arrival of news that is interpreted as negative by the market, larger investors on average react more negatively than smaller investors.
It is apparent that the above-presented hypotheses require investor-specific transaction records in order to be testable. The methodology utilized for testing the two hypotheses is described next.
Methodology
The investigation of our hypotheses requires us to 1) identify positive and negative news events, 2) measure investors' reactions to these events and 3) measure investor size. 
Measuring reaction
Investors' reactions to the disclosure of new firm-specific information is gauged by first identifying all investors who have traded in the disclosing company C's stock during the week after the disclosure 9 , including the day of disclosure itself, from the Finnish Central Securities 7 A minimum of 365 * 5/7 * 90% = 234 daily return observations is required to form a valid market model for each stock and event. Valid return data is hence required for 90% of the weekdays. 8 The HEX Portfolio Index is a value weighted index where all firms listed on the main list of the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX) are represented. However, the weight of any individual firm is limited to 10% thus eliminating the dominance of a few big firms listed on the HEX (especially Nokia).
9 Investor reactions are monitored for one calendar week after the disclosure of information in order to guarantee that the information is available to all investors.
Depository central register. 10 The net holdings before (NH I, C, t-1 ) and after (NH I, C, t+6 ) the disclosure are then calculated for investor I by aggregating the initial balance and all transactions up to and including date t-1 and t+6. An investor reaction proxy R I, C, t, t+6 is then calculated according to the following:
The above An obvious alternative when measuring investor reaction is to calculate the simple change in NH I, C during the time period t to t+6. The above defined approach is however preferred for one fundamental and two econometric reasons. Firstly, we believe that the investor reaction proxy defined in equation (7) better expresses how investors themselves perceive their actions. 11 Secondly, if we employ the simple changes methodology an econometric problem occurs when the initial position NH I, C, t-1 equals zero (division by zero). Thirdly, the simple 10 If a company has multiple stock series, the different series are treated as separate companies in the analysis. This approach is taken since treating different stock series as one would yield measurement errors, since the stocks of the different series might be differently valued. Totally disregarding either of the series would naturally also yield potentially severe measurement errors.
changes methodology by default induces a bias in R I, C, t, t+6 since the distribution is clearly asymmetric around zero, taking values [-1, ∞] when NH I, C, t-1 ≠0. Another alternative when measuring investor reaction is to employ a discrete framework, for instance by assigning the reaction proxy variable the value zero for decreases in holdings and one for increases in holdings. However, by moving into a discrete framework we lose the magnitude of the reaction, as only the direction of the investor reactions remains.
To summarise, the way of measuring investor reaction proposed in equation (7) and employed in this study enables us to measure both the direction and the magnitude of the investor reactions, still avoiding some of the pitfalls of the simple changes methodology. However, we note that the employed investor reaction proxy also suffers from asymmetry to some extent, especially when NH I, C, t-1 =0
Measuring investor size
We create an investor size variable by dividing the observations for each firm separately into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-1 and assigning the values 1 (smallest 10 th of initial holding) to 10 (largest 10th). The investor size identification is done for each firm separately in order to avoid having any investor group excessively dominated by transactions in a few firms. Investor size is hence defined as a relative measure among investors that trade in the same stock. Further, we exclude observations where the initial number of shares equals zero, due to short sale constraints.
The data
The total data set used in the study consists of 1) the Finnish Central Securities Depository central register data set and 2) firm-specific news announcements.
The Finnish Central Securities Depository Central Register data set
The employed transaction data set is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the most comprehensive and complete transaction data sets that have been employed in this field of research up to this date. Investors are categorized into six major groups according to their legal status. These six groups are further divided into several subgroups according to more specific characteristics.
All Finnish individuals and institutions are required to register their holdings in their own name, but foreigners can choose to act in the name of a nominee. The holdings of foreigners that choose to act in a nominee name are pooled together into larger pools with the holdings of the nominee. However, the data set contains information that can be utilized to discriminate between transactions executed by foreigners and by the nominee itself. The task of disintegrating the foreigners acting in nominee names further into different subtypes, such as individuals and institutions, is however made impossible by nominee registration. Further, the register does not separate indirect shareholdings through financial institutions, such as mutual funds. Indirect holdings are registered in the names of the financial institutions, and are thus treated as property of the financial institutions in this study. This is well in line with the purpose of this study, as financial institutions by Finnish law must exercise full control over the investment policy of their indirect holdings.
Firm-specific news announcements
We identify positive and negative news by first retrieving 12 the announcement dates for all firm specific news disclosures during the time period 1.5.1996-30.4.2001 of the total news items, the final event sample contains 61 positive and 61 negative news items.
Summary statistics
The total data set containing all investors' reactions to the 122 news disclosures, consists of 45,858 observations. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 13 In order to avoid the pitfalls of infrequent trading, the 15 most traded stocks are identified on an annual basis by computing the daily EUR turnover and aggregating these turnovers up to yearly values. This procedure identifies altogether 28 stocks that belong to the 15 most traded stocks for some of the investigated years. We feel confident that limiting our study to the 15 most traded stocks on the HEX does not damage generalization of our results, as globally significant stock markets as a rule offer even higher liquidity than the liquidity for these 15 stocks. 
Positive news

Negative news
The one-week cumulative abnormal returns following the disclosure of firm-specific news, displayed in Table 2 , reveal that the CARs on average are equal to zero and thus do not show signs of any systematic bias due estimation problems. The average CARs for the negative and positive events clearly deviate from zero as expected. Further, we find that the average CARs for the negative and positive events are of same magnitude in absolute terms, indicating fairly symmetric extreme tails in the news distribution. 
Results
The average reaction to positive news for different investor size groups is displayed in Table   3 . The fact that all size groups on average significantly decrease their holdings is explained by that all investors, regardless of absolute size, receive equal weights when the averages are calculated for the reaction variables. Hence, for the market to clear, this finding implies that the very largest investors -although few in number -on the market on average increase their holdings when positive information is disclosed. Our findings lend support to our first hypothesis, predicting that larger investors will interpret positive information more favorably than do smaller investors, as larger investors on average react more positively to positive information than do smaller investors 14 .
Furthermore, the framework presented above also predicts that the magnitude of the disagreement between more and less overconfident investors will depend on the magnitude of the news. This prediction is supported by the extremely significant differences 15 in the average reactions of the different size groups, as we here investigate the 2.5% most positive news events.
14 The correlation coefficient between the number of the investor size group (1-10) and the average reaction to positive news for the group is 0.50. 15 For instance, the average reaction of Group 10 is significantly larger than that of Group 9, yielding a t-value of 12.0. The average reaction to negative news for different investor size groups, displayed in Table 4 , reveal that larger investors on average react more negatively to negative news than do smaller investors 16 . This trend in the average reactions for the different size group hence confirms our second hypothesis, which predicts that larger investors react more negatively to negative news than do smaller investors. We further regress the reaction for each investor on the investor-size variable in order to verify the results presented above. The regression results presented in Table 5 confirm that investor size is positively (negatively) related to investor reaction to positive (negative) news.
Interestingly enough, we find that the estimated coefficients for the investor size variable furthermore are rather equal in magnitude (0.016 for positive news and -0.023 for negative news). Table 5 displays the OLS regression estimates for negative and positive news events. An investor reaction proxy, which expresses how a certain investor changes his/her holding in a certain company during the week after the disclosure of positive or negative news, is OLS regressed against the investor size group number (1-10). Investor reaction is measured as the number of stocks bought (sold) during the week consecutive to the event divided by the total terminal (initial) number of stocks held. Investor size groups are created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-1 for each firm separately.
The investor size identification is done for each firm separately in order to avoid having any investor group excessively dominated by transactions in few firms. Investor size is hence defined as a relative measure among investors that trade in the same stock. 
Positive news Negative news
Our findings gain support from Lee (1992) , as he documents a positive correlation between large buy (sell) orders and positive (negative) earnings news. Further, the Bartov et al. (2000) find that firms that to a higher degree are owned by institutional investors display smaller post earnings-announcement abnormal returns. They argue that institutional investors are more sophisticated and thus incorporate the new information more promptly than other investors. In the light of our study it seems feasible that the results presented by Bartov et al. (2000) could be driven by differences in overconfidence. Our findings also confirm the findings of Ekholm (2006), as he finds that large investors react more positively (negatively) following positive (negative) earnings surprises than do small investors. In addition, Cohen et al. (2002) also document that large investors increase (decrease) their holdings in a stock in response to positive (negative) cash flow news. Again, it seems feasible that these results are driven by differences in investor overconfidence.
Robustness tests
The impressive size and span of the data set employed in this study certainly reduces the risk of spurious results due to a biased sample. However, we perform a set of robustness tests in order to further ensure the validity of the central findings in this study.
We split the data for both negative and positive news events into two equally large subsamples according to date of disclosure. We then redo the regressions presented in Table 5 for the four sub samples. We find that the parameter estimates for the models estimated on the sub-samples are essentially equal 17 to the parameter estimates estimated for the full samples (Table 5) . We hence feel confident that it is highly unlikely that the results in this study are due to random properties of the investigated data sample.
Alternative explanations
The evidence presented above shows that investor reaction to news is conditional on investor size. Furthermore, the evidence lends strong support to that differences in overconfidence is the source of the heterogeneous behavior. However, in the following we consider some alternative explanations for the observed empirical findings.
Portfolio rebalancing
Especially larger investors frequently employ investment strategies where the weight of any stock in the portfolio is limited
18
. Thus, for these investors, large price increases for some specific stock occasionally induces selling activity in order to decrease the weight of that stock. This scenario hence implies that large investors on average should be keener towards selling after large positive price increases than small investors
19
. We conclude that this phenomenon does not seem to explain our findings, as we find that large investors are keener towards increasing (decreasing) their holdings following extremely positive (negative) news, than their smaller counterparts.
Lagging order book
Arguably there could exist differences between different investors regarding the availability of information. For instance, if smaller investors on average receive information later than larger investors, larger investors could utilize smaller investors' orders in the order book in order to achieve favorable prices. Thus, larger investors would buy (sell) all lagging sell (buy) orders in the order book following positive (negative) news. However, as the investor reactions are monitored for a full calendar week and the average depth of the order book is only a fraction of the daily traded volume, we are convinced that this is not the explanation for our empirical findings.
Liquidity constraints
Even though we have investigated the 15 most traded stocks it is reasonable to assume that large investors to some degree suffer from liquidity constraints. In practice liquidity constraints imply that larger investors cannot sell or buy as aggressively as they would wish to. Hence this should lead to large investors' reacting more moderately than smaller investors.
In terms of our reaction measure, this implies an in absolute terms lesser average reaction for larger investors than for smaller investors. Our findings however show that following negative news, the absolute value of the average reaction for the largest investors (size group 10) is larger than the corresponding values for investor size groups 2 to 9. Hence, our findings cannot be explained by liquidity constraints.
Initial holding
As mentioned above we exclude investors with zero initial holding in the stock due to short sale constraints. However, investors with initial holdings less than a stock exchange round lot will in some cases face sale constraints. This will result in an upward bias for the reaction variable for the smallest investor group. We observe indications of this problem in our results, as the average reaction for size group 1 is significantly larger than that of group 2, for both negative and positive news. However, the problem is limited to the smallest size group and will neither alter the results for the other size groups nor our conclusions.
Economic implications
In order to examine economic consequences of the behavior of the different size groups we 21 The data set created in this study does not reveal the exact dates when trades occurred. However, we feel that the assumption that at least half of the trades that are executed during the calendar week after the disclosure of new information occur during the first three days (t=0 to t=2), is very reasonable. Figure 3 . Interestingly enough, the results suggest persistent differences in the subsequent average cumulative abnormal returns for the different size groups following negative news. For instance, the 56-day average CAR for size group 10 is significantly positive (with a t-value of 2.53), while the corresponding CAR for size group 1 is significantly negative (with a t-value of -15.84). Furthermore, the differences between the groups are extremely persistent; the inferences do not change for different time periods.
Indeed, the drift in the average CARs for the different size groups appears to be as large for the second half of the time period as for the first half. after the disclosure of negative firm specific news. CARs are cumulated from t=3 onwards, hence assuming that at least half of the trades during the week (t=0 to t=6) after news disclosures occur during the first three days (t=0 to t=2). An investor's CAR is calculated by assigning the stock's CAR (CAR multiplied by -1) if the investor increases (decreases) his/her holding. All CARs are calculated using 365 calendar day market models where a minimum of 365 * 5/7 * 90% = 234 daily return observations are required to form a valid market model for each stock and event. Negative news events are defined as the 2.5% events with the most negative t=0 to t=6
CARs. CARs are calculated for periods subsequent to firm specific news disclosures for the 15 most traded shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the time period 1.5.1996-30.4.2001 . Investor size groups are created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-1 for each firm separately. The investor size identification is done for each firm separately in order to avoid having any investor group excessively dominated by transactions in few firms. Investor size is hence defined as a relative measure among investors that trade in the same stock. A priori, it is hard to motivate any deviation from the assumption that investors on average behave homogenously. However, recent research documents that institutional or large investors act as antagonists to other investors by showing opposite trading behavior following disclosure of new information. Ekholm (2006) argues that this difference in behavior is driven by differences in overconfidence, and that investor size seems to be a good measure of overconfidence. The framework presented in Gervais and Odean (2001) further supports investor size being a good proxy for overconfidence, as larger investment portfolios tend to be managed by investors who are more experienced than smaller investors.
We set out to test a hypothesis that larger investors are less overconfident than smaller investors, and thus will react more positively (negatively) to positive (negative) news. We employ an extremely comprehensive official transactions data set from Finland, which allows us to monitor the actions of each investor following the disclosure of new information.
We document robust evidence of that investor size describes investor behavior under new information, as larger investors on average react more positively (negatively) to good (bad) news than do smaller investors. Our findings lend firm support to our hypothesis, which states that larger investors are less overconfident than smaller investors. We consider several alternative explanations, but are forced to reject all of them. Furthermore, we investigate the economic implications of the documented behavior, and find evidence of significant differences between the performances of the different investor size groups after disclosures of negative news. We find that the performance of smaller, or more overconfident, investors is in general hurt by their behavior following negative news.
In the light of these results, it seems increasingly feasible that several recent findings of heterogeneous investor behavior are functions of differences in overconfidence.
